

SCP V-23 02-70

02-70

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

15 JANUARY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

1 OF 1

Ap

STATSPEC

Confidential



SURVEY

of Communist Propaganda

Confidential

15 JANUARY 1970
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 2)

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

W A R N I N G

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

CONTENTS

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

- FRG-GDR Relations: Moscow, Berlin Hail GDR Draft Treaty 1
USSR, GDR Assail Scheduled Meetings in West Berlin

SOUTHEAST ASIA

- Thai CP Claims "People's War" Expanded, "State Power" Set Up . . 5
Topic in Brief 6
Comment on 1969 "Victories" in Vietnam

EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

- Czechoslovak Media Re-examine "Closed" Masaryk Case 10
Prosecutor's Report Adds New Dimension of "Accident"
CPSU's History of 1948 Break Evokes Yugoslav Anger 13

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS

- French Communist Party Rebukes Anti-Soviet Intellectual 15
PRAVDA Backs French Politburo Against "Right Opportunist"

THE USSR

- Kalmyk Removed From Post as Smolensk First Secretary 22
Criticism of Smolensk Leadership Began at End of 1968
Kalmyk Warned Against Abuses of Power by Leader
Conservative Wing of Ukrainian Writers Union Makes Gain 25

COMMUNIST CHINA

- Economic Production Claims, Aspirations Highlighted in Media . . 28
Fukien Radio Tells of High Targets for Model Brigade
Variant Views on Industrial Priorities Indicated
RED FLAG Article States Opinions of Shanghai MRC
RED FLAG Urges Cautious Approach to Party Rebuilding 32
New Party Units Supreme Over Revolutionary Committees
Hunan County Reviews Relations Between Army and Party
New CCP Committee Established for Shaoshan Commune

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 1 -

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

FRG-GDR RELATIONS: MOSCOW, BERLIN HAIL GDR DRAFT TREATY

Soviet and East German officials as well as routine propaganda continue to endorse the GDR draft treaty--forwarded to Bonn on 18 December--on the establishment of equal relations between the two German states. Most notably, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin, in his 13 January press conference, describes the treaty proposal as a "useful and important initiative directed at easing tensions in the center of Europe." And Ulbricht on 9 January at a New Year's reception for diplomatic mission chiefs in East Berlin said that the treaty offers the Brandt government "a true chance for a fresh beginning in its relations with the GDR." As reported in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 10th, Ulbricht said that it is "high time to execute a turnabout toward reason, toward a policy of recognizing realities," and that the GDR for its part is ready to enter into businesslike negotiations with the FRG "on the basis of equal rights and mutual recognition under international law." Consistent with the propaganda line of the past month, Ulbricht warns of the "machinations of rightist extremist forces in West Germany" who would oppose the normalizing of relations. GDR Foreign Minister Winzer in an interview in Bucharest's SCINTEIA on 11 January called the treaty a "true touchstone for the Eastern policy of the new FRG Government," adding that "even the negotiations on the conclusion of such a treaty . . . could have positive effects for all of Europe and could help solve the problems of European security."

While pressing Bonn to open talks on the treaty, the GDR sustains its attacks on various aspects of West German policy which it charges are at variance with a normalization of relations. Thus, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 9th calls the West German attitude "on the nonrecognition of frontiers . . . a permanent offense against international law" and views the draft treaty as an opportunity to reverse this policy.

ADN on the 10th summarizes "documentation published by the GDR press" on that day showing that Bonn legislation contains "an entire system of laws, orders, and court decisions which are determined by the spirit of revenge and open hostility toward the GDR and other European states," citing among other examples "legally embodied revanchist frontier demands" and claims to regulate citizenship over people residing within the 1937 frontiers.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 2 -

The ADN item defends the inclusion of Article III in the draft treaty which includes the obligation of the treaty partners to abolish all provisions which run counter to the principles of international law. ADN concludes that the "discriminatory acts" poison the atmosphere in Europe and that their abolition "is one of the basic preconditions for the proper joint existence alongside each other of the two equal sovereign German states. Good neighborliness and juridical aggression are incompatible." And ADN on the 12th reports on documentation in that day's press assailing the FRG posture on the "bankrupt Hallstein doctrine which has the presumptuous claim to sole representation as its basis."

BRANDT SPEECH

Available East German propaganda on Chancellor Brandt's 14 January State of the Nation message is confined so far to editorialized reportage, a lengthy ADN dispatch on the 14th concluding that his failure to deal in detail with the draft treaty "emphatically underlined the continuity of his policy with that of the preceding Bonn Government." ADN says that Brandt asserted that "recognition of the GDR under international law is out of the question for us." It also reports that he spoke "particularly sharply in favor of the illegal integration of West Berlin in the West German state" and gave his backing to the "disruptive" FRG parliamentary meetings planned for West Berlin at the end of January.

The initial TASS report of the Brandt speech highlights his declaration that recognition of the GDR "is out of the question for us" and says that he "actually rejected" the draft treaty proposed by the GDR. TASS does note that Brandt spoke in favor of talks with the GDR although "he set forth a number of preliminary conditions." According to TASS, the Chancellor "justified the 'right' of factions and commissions of the West German Bundestag to hold their meetings in West Berlin, that is, on territory that does not belong to the FRG."

USSR, GDR Assail Scheduled Meetings in West Berlin

In a note to the FRG, the GDR formally protested plans for holding West German parliamentary meetings in West Berlin in the week of 19-27 January and linked the "provocation" to the treaty proposal. The note, reported by ADN on 10 January, asserted that the meetings were planned "evidently at the instigation of the CDU/CSU" and are directed against any easing of tensions in the center of Europe and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 3 -

against "the occurrence of a regulated coexistence of the two German states." It voiced dismay over Bonn's decision to convene the meetings "just after" the GDR proffered a draft treaty. Noting the importance of respecting West Berlin's status as an "independent political entity"--a provision included in the draft treaty--the protest said that Bonn "should refrain from disruptive actions, inimical to easing tensions, before the start of negotiations on establishing relations based on equality" between the two German states. The note concluded with the vague threat that the GDR will be constrained to take "requisite measures" if the "unlawful" meetings are held.

Like the note, an East Berlin radio commentary on the 13th questioned why the decision on the meetings was taken "shortly after" the submission of the GDR's draft treaty, asking rhetorically if this "reflects the effects of furious attacks against detente and against the restitution of normal relations under international law between the two German states launched by people like Strauss and Barzel."

Zamyatin on the 13th took due note of the parliamentary meetings scheduled for West Berlin, but apparently did not link them directly to the GDR draft treaty proposal. As reported by TASS, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said only that the planned meetings are a result of the former policy pursued by the CDU/CSU and "have nothing to do with the task of ensuring tranquility in the center of Europe. The FRG has no rights to West Berlin." The brief TASS report of the GDR protest to the FRG on the West Berlin meetings--carried in PRAVDA on the 12th--did not include the note's expression of concern that the decision to hold the parliamentary gatherings came "just after" submission of the draft treaty.

While failing to suggest that the meetings might adversely affect talks with the GDR on a draft treaty, propaganda has hinted at possible consequences for Bonn-Moscow relations and broader East-West relations. In what seems to be an oblique reference to the recent USSR-FRG exchange of views on a non-use-of-force agreement, an IZVESTIYA article on 13 January concludes with the observation that the Bonn leadership must be aware of the fact that "the aggravation of tension in connection with West Berlin cannot serve the cause of mutual understanding between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany." An even more ominous warning of the possible consequences of the Berlin meetings appeared in a 6 January "Radio

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 4 -

Peace and Progress" commentary beamed to German listeners. Referring to the fact that "the press has been writing a lot about the impending talks of the four superpowers on West Berlin," the commentary says that

should it become known that on the eve of an exchange of views that Bonn is preparing demonstrations of some kind or other, then it would become evident how inopportune they would be. One cannot help remembering the Adenauer Government's provocative actions during the Soviet-U.S. exchange of views in 1959-1961. At that time, too, this kind of action led to no good. And, esteemed listeners, there is no reason whatever to believe that it is going to be different this time.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 5 -

SOUTHEAST ASIA

THAI CP CLAIMS "PEOPLE'S WAR" EXPANDED, "STATE POWER" SET UP

The Thai Communist Party, in propaganda marking the year's end, claims that its "people's war" has expanded and that "people's state power" has been set up in different areas. A broadcast over the Thai party's clandestine radio--"The Voice of the People of Thailand"--on 30 December maintains that the armed struggle has spread into 34 provinces and covers "all, or almost all," of the districts in many of these provinces. (A 6 August 1969 broadcast over the same radio claimed that fighting had spread to more than 130 districts in 33 of the 71 provinces.) The 30 December broadcast declares that during 1969 "the liberation soldiers and people" engaged the enemy some 870 times, killed or wounded about 1,050 "U.S.-Thanom army police and suppression officials," and downed or damaged 46 planes and helicopters.

The broadcast also asserts that "villages and people have been liberated from the U.S.-Thanom clique's reactionary oppressive administration"; and it claims that "revolutionary people's state power has been set up in several regions." The first known instance of a Thai communist claim to have liberated a specific village was in a 6 December 1969 broadcast which alleged that the liberation soldiers, under the leadership of the party, on 28 November liberated a village in Pua District, Nan Province.* A 1 December 1969 Thai CP message on the party's 27th anniversary had asserted that "people's state power has been set up in various regions." However, Communist Party statements earlier in 1969 did not make this claim.

Viewing the prospects for 1970, a Thai clandestine broadcast on 1 January declares that it will be a year of greater victory and that "state power already established will become stronger, and more organs of people's state power will be set up in other areas." The broadcast pledges adherence to the party's 10-point short-term policy which was promulgated in a 1 December 1968 Thai CP communique marking the party's 26th anniversary. The first of the 10 points called for waging people's war and the establishment of a "people's government."

* Propaganda on this incident was reviewed in the 10 December 1969 FBIS TRENDS, page 16.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 6 -

T O P I C I N B R I E F

COMMENT ON 1969 "VICTORIES" IN VIETNAM

During the first two weeks in January, both Hanoi and Liberation Front media continue to publicize articles on alleged 1969 communist feats in South Vietnam, which had initially been reviewed in the 31 December "special" PLAF command communique. Year-end discussion of the "victories" had also included articles in the DRV army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, attributed to "Chien Binh" (combatant) and "Truc Chien" (hand-to-hand combat), as well as in the Front's radio and press.* Hanoi radio on 10 and 11 January broadcasts articles by Truc Chien published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 7th and 8th which focus, respectively, on the failure of increased allied firepower to prevent defeats and on increased U.S. casualties in 1969. For its part, Liberation Radio on 11, 12, 13 January broadcasts a three-part article on Vietnamization which is attributed to "Cuu Long" (Mekong.)**

TRUC CHIEN ON Hanoi radio on the 10th broadcasts an article
U.S. FIREPOWER headlined "U.S. Firepower Could Not Save the
 Americans From Bitter Blows in 1969" by Truc
Chien, which it says it published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. (The
broadcast does not mention the issue of the paper in which it appears,
but the Hanoi radio press review on the 7th indicates that an article
by Truc Chien was frontpaged in the army paper on that day.)

As broadcast by Hanoi, the article presents detailed statistics on the increase in B-52 and other air strike missions, also giving statistics on tonnage of bombs as well as on naval and artillery shellings. The article declares: "We can say that in 1969 the U.S.-puppet firepower was the most violent on the southern battlefield." But it goes on to claim that this has not prevented the southerners' "offensive" from developing continually. To document this claim, it presents statistics for U.S. casualties throughout 1969. For example, it claims that during 35 days in the spring

* See the FBIS SURVEY of 2 January 1970, pages 9-10, and the FBIS TRENDS of 7 January 1970, pages 3-5.

** Numerous articles on military tactics and strategy since 1965 have appeared under the pseudonym Cuu Long, but this is the first one known to have been published since January 1969. See FBIS TRENDS of 15 January 1969, pages 7-9 and 29 January 1969, pages 6-7.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 7 -

1969 "offensive" the U.S. casualty toll exceeded that of the first 45 days of the Tet offensive in 1968. In the autumn, it claims, the Defense Department's reports showed that the total of U.S. men killed or wounded exceeded that of the "puppet" troops. And it goes on to explain that this was when the United States believed that "their tens of thousands of tons of bombs caused 'heavy Viet Cong losses.'"

Truc Chien went on to say that the "marvelous power" of the people's war has constantly aggravated basic U.S. weaknesses--"poor fighting spirit and the infantry troops' low combativity--while virtually restricting their temporary strength in terms of weapons, technique, and firepower." But he concludes on the warning note that the "aggressors" have continued to cling to their obsolete "firepower is decisive" theory.

TRUC CHIEN ON U.S. CASUALTIES On the 11th, Hanoi radio broadcasts another article by Truc Chien, said to have been published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 8th, which describes the "heavy" U.S. casualties during 1969. Many of the year-end military roundups repeated the statistics in the "special" PLAF command communique which claimed that U.S. and "satellite" troops accounted for 235,000 of the alleged total of 645,000 allied troops said to have been killed, wounded, or captured. And Truc Chien now claims that during the first year of the war "under Nixon's command," 200,000 Americans were killed or wounded. The article says that reducing U.S. casualties was one of the "basic, top-priority requirements" of the clear-and-hold strategy, and that it was hoped that this would "soothe" the antiwar struggle in the United States, boost morale of the U.S. troops, and bolster the fighting spirit of ARVN.

Truc Chien maintains that the Americans were not able to achieve their aim through such things as adopting a defensive strategy, and he claims that during the past year the percentage of dead and wounded U.S. officers was especially high. He says that the more dense the defense system, the more conspicuous the target for the communists. And describing PLAF tactics, he says that while the allies defended the inner and outer perimeters, the communists were "deployed in a 'fine tooth comb' position from without and within enemy lines." The article concludes by saying that "no magic power can help Nixon shorten the list of U.S. soldiers killed in action in Vietnam, and no magic power can save the U.S. aggressive undertaking from complete collapse"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 8 -

CUU LONG ON VIETNAMIZATION The three-installment Cuu Long article, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 11-13 January, echoes the basic points of other recent propaganda on the U.S. Vietnamization policy. Thus, it scores President Nixon for having "brazenly" said that regardless of what happens at the Paris peace talks, the United States will carry on the Vietnamization plan. The first installment sets out to demonstrate that the ARVN will not be able to carry out the mission in which the United States has failed. In this regard, Cuu Long argues that the "puppet army's" fighting spirit has always been low, that the command is composed "entirely of untalented and corrupt generals," and that the "puppets" cannot be consolidated and strengthened when they face "our increasingly matured and vigorous PLAF."

The second installment is devoted to the alleged failure of the accelerated pacification plan, termed in standard fashion the "backbone" of Vietnamization. Cuu Long says that "the enemy pretended that the puppets" were in charge of carrying out pacification but that "in truth, U.S. advisers have directly assumed command even at provincial and district levels." He declares that "the enemy has directed his spearhead at the base of our people's revolutionary movement," with such barbarous actions as the B-52 strikes. Along with "cruel war tricks," the "enemy," he says, has built additional posts and set up a number of village administrative committees, "thus creating a number of difficulties and disturbances for our compatriots' livelihood." But he goes on to take issue with the "U.S.-puppet exaggerated claim" that the "puppet administration controls 92.5 percent of the South Vietnam population." Cuu Long counters by saying, for example, that

in central Trung Bo our armed forces and people have steadfastly maintained the areas under their control. In southern Trung Bo, our compatriots have even arisen to gain mastership over new areas. In Saigon border rural areas, where almost every bush and garden have been destroyed by the enemy, our people have been clinging to the land to step up guerrilla warfare and continue to encircle, exert pressure on, and shell the enemy's dens in Saigon, Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, etc.

The third installment of the article turns to the allegedly unsuccessful efforts to "consolidate" the Saigon government, and mentions in this regard the naming of "the crooked" Khiem as the new premier and the increase in taxes. Cuu Long also discusses the U.S. antiwar

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 9 -

movement and other difficulties of the "second front in the U.S. imperialist rear." He contrasts the claimed U.S. isolation with the "wide support" for the PRG. Making the usual claim that the Vietnamization program has been "initially thwarted," Cuu Long concludes with the slogan that the people, determined to abide by Ho's teaching, will continue to fight to sweep the last aggressor from the country.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 10 -

EUROPEAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

CZECHOSLOVAK MEDIA RE-EXAMINE "CLOSED" MASARYK CASE

A month after the case involving the death of former Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk was officially declared "closed," Prague television continues a series on the case and promises another installment in February.

The Czechoslovak Prosecutor General's Office report winding up the case was released on 17 December 1969; on the 19th Prague television opened its series with a program entitled "The Campaign and Its Authors," which attacked the mass communications media and "all the major initiators and protagonists* of the [1968] campaign" to re-examine the circumstances of Masaryk's death, officially ruled a "suicide" at the time of its occurrence in 1948. The second installment, carried on 9 January, went over the ground of the Prosecutor General's findings again, interviewing "qualified officials" and citing "witnesses" to prove that the possibility of murder "can be completely excluded." The telecast concluded with an announcement that a third and final installment, devoted mainly to a "profile" of Jan Masaryk, is to be shown on 6 February. The continuing, defensive airing of the case seems responsive to the unremitting appearance in the West of articles and books which question both the original verdict of suicide and the "final" December 1969 report which added the theory of an "accident."

* On 20 November, CTK reported the continuation of the trial of Vitezslav Kadlcak, who was charged with "slandering the republic and its representatives" in the spring of 1968 by "accusing several leading Czechoslovak officials of participating in the plot of the alleged murder of Jan Masaryk." The trial had begun in February 1969 but had been adjourned "to give Kadlcak a possibility to submit authentic documents" on Masaryk's death. The report said "the sentence" was expected on 26 November, and on the 27th RUDE PRAVO said Kadlcak had been sentenced to 32 months in prison.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

-- 11 --

Soviet media have avoided any mention of the purported windup phase of the Masaryk case, which had been a particularly sore point in Moscow-Prague relations during 1968; the Soviet radio and press had reacted angrily to suggestions by Czechoslovak commentators that the original suicide verdict was a coverup for foul play, and to bland assertions that Moscow should welcome a reopening of the case that would lay to rest once and for all the rumors which implicated the Soviet Union.

Recent Prague comment has sought to fit the reopening of the case retrospectively into the official picture of 1968 as a year of Western-inspired counterrevolution. Thus a Kolar commentary broadcast by the Prague radio in Czech and Slovak to citizens abroad on 19 December 1969 recalled that the case was reopened as the result of an open letter to the Prosecutor General in the 3 April 1968 issue of the weekly STUDENT by the prominent journalist Ivan Svitak, who had in turn been influenced by an April 1965 article in the West German weekly DER SPIEGEL. A serial article on the 1968 "counterrevolution" in the 20 December 1969 Bratislava PRAVDA included the remark that "Ivan Svitak stayed in his country not one minute longer than he had to" at the time of the invasion and that he subsequently "entered employment with Professor Brzezinski and is now fulfilling the tasks of the 'Russian Institute of Columbia University' in New York."

Prosecutor's Report Adds New Dimension of "Accident"

The 17 December 1969 Prosecutor General's Office report which "closed" the Masaryk case sought a compromise that would take account of the serious doubt publicly cast on the original, Soviet-sponsored verdict of suicide without unduly antagonizing Moscow. The solution it chose was to introduce the possibility of "accident" as an alternative to the suicide theory, but without reversing the 1948 verdict. While the objective was to lay the case to rest as unprovocatively as possible, the effect was to perpetuate and multiply the uncertainties.

As summarized by the Prague domestic service on 17 December, the report concluded that in the early morning hours of 10 March 1948, Masaryk "was sitting, or wanted to sit, in the window of his apartment on the second floor of the Cernin Palace in Prague and tried, as was his habit, to overcome his insomnia." (Western investigations have determined that the window in question was a small bathroom one with a sill high above the floor.) The

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 12 -

Czechoslovak report continued: "At this point, he either suddenly decided to commit suicide or he lost his balance and fell out of the window through an unfortunate accident." Those who voiced suspicions of murder, it said, "affected the memory of Jan Masaryk in an untrue and disrespectful manner," and "some" of these people "attempted to misuse the tragic events in a gross fashion to slander the socialist state and to attack our allies."

The report declared that the "considerable time" which had elapsed since the incident and "the incomplete original investigation" precluded a "safe" judgment as to "whether a suicide or an unfortunate accident took place." Both versions, it said, fit in with "all the known clues, and they are contradicted by none"; since no crime was committed, "it has been decided to drop the case."

Compounding the uncertainties, six days before the report was released the head of the investigation department of the Prosecutor General's Office, Dr. Karel Pesta, gave the impression in an interview over the Prague domestic radio that the Prosecutor General would opt more positively for the accident theory. Pesta termed the possibility of suicide "doubtful," pointing out that "even on his last evening" Masaryk had "prepared for the next day; he prepared a speech in connection with the visit of a Polish delegation, and so forth." There was "no letter, no attempt to arrange his private affairs, to say farewell." Pesta anticipated the final report in attributing the presence of "pillows" at the scene to an effort by Masaryk to warm vital organs as he sat in the open window. He concluded, as the final report was to do, that in the absence of any crime, "the case of Jan Masaryk's death has been filed away."

The unlikelihood that the final report would end discussion of the case by Czechoslovak media was recognized by the domestic service interviewer, who thanked Pesta and the Prosecutor General's Office for "explaining the whole case, which for so many months last year excited our public, and to which we shall again return more than once."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 13 -

CPSU'S HISTORY OF 1948 BREAK EVOKES YUGOSLAV ANGER

Although on the surface Yugoslav-Soviet relations have improved since Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Belgrade last September, Yugoslav attacks on the new, revised CPSU history highlight the continuing underlying tensions and the persisting ideological struggle between the two countries. Radio Belgrade reports that all Yugoslav papers on 5 January publicized accounts of the Soviet history, highlighting the sections on Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform. Pointing out that the history was authored by a group of writers headed by Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev, and by implication approved by the Soviet party leadership, Yugoslav commentators conclude that the new history in effect blames the Yugoslav leadership for the 1948 split.

Answering a question at an 8 January press conference, Foreign Affairs Secretariat spokesman Vujica, as reported by TANYUG, charged that the portion of the history on Soviet-Yugoslav relations represents "an arbitrary and impermissible manipulation of historical facts." History, he said, "has already made its judgment about these events and manipulations cannot alter them." Although the Yugoslavs apparently do not want to exacerbate relations with Moscow over the issue and explicitly recognize that such historical rewrites are related to requirements of domestic and foreign propaganda, they have asserted a need to put their views of such "reinterpretations" on the record, focusing on treatment of the sensitive issue of party-state relations and on issues which appear to them to smack of neo-Stalinism.

According to a 5 January TANYUG account, the new CPSU version of the 1948 Yugoslav-Soviet break says:

"In the process of construction and development of the community of socialist countries there emerged certain difficulties. Deep concern in the CPSU was caused by the relations with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the state relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. At the time when the CPSU and the communist parties of the people's democracies regulated relations with each other in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party took different positions on a series of matters of principle, which differed from the positions of the communist parties of other socialist countries."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 14 -

Although this Soviet view of the split is sufficiently vague to blur the differences that divided the two parties, Yugoslav media complain that it in effect blames Tito for the 1948 events and contravenes the spirit of the Belgrade and Moscow declarations of 1955 and 1956 which defined relations between the two countries as based on principles of independence, sovereignty, and noninterference. Gromyko's 2-6 September 1969 visit to Belgrade produced a joint communique reaffirming mutual adherence to the 1955 and 1956 documents.

Yugoslav comment on the CPSU history in general views it as another manifestation of neo-Stalinism, with particular stress on its attempts to "rehabilitate Stalin" and to mitigate his responsibility for failure to properly assess and meet the German invasion in World War II. Such efforts to enhance Stalin's image as well as the new interpretations of the 1948 split with Belgrade, Radio Zagreb's commentator Sundic says on 5 January, fit into a general pattern of Soviet intensification of "the so-called ideological struggle" at home, Soviet emphasis on "one correct path to socialism" and on proletarian internationalism, and the introduction of the "limited sovereignty theory." Although Yugoslav commentators do not directly relate these alleged neo-Stalinist manifestations to the events in Czechoslovakia--a topic presently off limits for Yugoslav media--or to the Sino-Soviet conflict, they imply a connection in such discussions of how "current events" shape the formulation of the Soviet history.

ITALIAN CP VIEWS

To demonstrate that the Yugoslavs are not the only ones disturbed by the new CPSU history, TANYUG reports on 12 January that the Italian party organ L'UNITA informed its readers at length about the document and raised questions as to its political significance. TANYUG goes on to note that the paper's foreign affairs editor Giuseppe Boffa pointed out that "an essential question in socialist society, the question of socialist democracy, ignored by Stalin, remains unanswered in the analysis of the Soviet past." The Italian Communist party has repeatedly advocated open discussion of socialist societies in general and "Stalinism" in particular--an exploration that would clearly serve Belgrade's interests as well.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 15 -

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS

FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY REBUKES ANTI-SOVIET INTELLECTUAL

The revolt of anti-Soviet party intellectuals that divided the Austrian and Italian Communist Parties in the aftermath of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia has also afflicted the French Communist Party (PCF), with Politburo member Roger Garaudy currently under fire for dissenting from the party's failure to sustain an unequivocal stand in opposition to Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia.

Unlike the Italian and other West European parties which have followed up their initial criticisms of the intervention by censuring the political retrocession imposed under the Husak regime, the PCF has chosen to remain silent on post-invasion developments in Prague, reiterating in a pro forma fashion its initial opposition to the invasion while insisting that this in no way signifies a change in its traditional policy of loyalty to the CPSU.

Garaudy, a leading party intellectual and director of the PCF's Center for Marxist Study and Research, is the chief dissenter from this policy of silence on post-invasion Czechoslovak developments. He has persisted in publicly attacking the USSR and has been repeatedly censured by the PCF Politburo and in the party press for violating "democratic centralism" by publicly contradicting the party line. The latest condemnation appeared on 18 December in a Politburo communique attacking Garaudy's new book "The Great Turning Point of Socialism." Although the party organ L'HUMANITE on 2 January carried an article by Garaudy rebutting the Politburo's broadside, counter-rebuttals in letters from party militants were still appearing in the paper as recently as 12 January and may presage a move to oust Garaudy from the Politburo at the PCF's 19th congress next month.

The fact that the PCF has scheduled talks with the French Socialist Party and has made overtures to other leftist parties with a view to taking "joint action" against government policy may tend to limit the extent of the sanctions the PCF will

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEILLANCE
15 JANUARY 1970

- 16 -

impose on Garaudy at this time, however. These potential allies of the PCF have been critical of its timid stance on the Czechoslovak question, and L'HUMANITE on 22 December carried a statement by Socialist Party First Secretary Alain Savary pointing out that in their coming talks "the Socialist and Communist parties will have to overcome difficulties . . . in particular with reference to Czechoslovakia and the common market."

THE POLITBURO INDICTMENT

As in the case of past party rebukes of Garaudy, the 18 December Politburo attack on his book--frontpaged in L'HUMANITE the next day--and the more recent letters denouncing him contain no specific call for sanctions against him. The Politburo communique chastises Garaudy for rejecting PCF Secretary General Waldeck Rochet's plea, at a 14 October Central Committee meeting, that he "change his attitude" and participate in preparations for the 19th party congress; according to the 14 November L'HUMANITE, Garaudy had disregarded this appeal by staying away from a 13 November Central Committee meeting at which draft theses to be submitted to the congress were unanimously approved, and had informed Rochet of his "opposition" to them. The Politburo statement further complains that the concepts expounded in Garaudy's book and on French TV represent an abandonment of the Leninist party principles of "democratic centralism, ideological unity, and the unity of decision and action." The antiparty heresies discerned in the book include suggestions that an effort aimed at "influencing events in the direction of . . . a democratized socialism in the Soviet Union" be initiated and that the PCF radically "modify both its strategy and tactics."

Alleging that Garaudy urges "revisionist and splitting activity at the international level" by advocating "an international agreement among all those who oppose the policy of the communist and workers movement" and publication of a journal to air their views,* the communique charges him with "open and intolerable aggression" against the CPSU and like-minded parties. By publishing the book, it says, Garaudy "moves into a new phase of the long evolution that separates him from scientific socialism."

* Anti-Soviet dissidents were expelled from the PCF last May for publishing a dissident journal called POLITIQUE AUJOURD' HUI. As in the case of publications of anti-Soviet dissidents expelled from the Austrian and Italian parties--the magazines WEINER TA. UCH and IL MANIFESTO, respectively--the French journal continued to publish after the purge of its editors.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 17 -

On an inside page of the same issue in which it printed the communique, L'HUMANITE summarized and excerpted illustrative portions of the book, highlighting its anti-Soviet tenor and alleging that "Garaudy devotes more than a third of his work to a violent attack on the policy of the CPSU." It quoted him as calling "the so-called Stalinist perversion" a necessary outgrowth of the system prevailing in the USSR, and it cited his conclusion that the Soviet Union is still ruled by a "military-bureaucratic complex." As described by L'HUMANITE, the title of Garaudy's book alludes to the "decisive choice" now confronting socialism: "alignment with the concepts of the current Soviet leaders" or the waging of a "battle of principle" against the CPSU. The paper indicated that Garaudy renewed earlier criticisms of the June 1969 Moscow international communist conference, observing that it was attended by more than 30 parties "whose representation was to say the least limited," that the main conference document was marked by "ideological weakness," and that the conclave ignored the crucial problem of the world movement--"that of the necessary and legitimate diversity of the models of socialism."

Garaudy had been censured earlier, in a 9 September Politburo statement, for having had the temerity to criticize the June conference's main document in an interview published in the Yugoslav party theoretical journal KOMUNIST. The Politburo statement noted that Garaudy's views were "completely contrary" to that of the PCF Central Committee, which had characterized the main document "as an important document which makes a valuable contribution to the struggle of communists and peoples throughout the world." It also pointed out that Garaudy's remarks contravened an "undertaking he gave to the Central Committee" on 21 October 1968 when he accepted the party's censure for violating democratic centralism. In the course of the KOMUNIST interview, published in the Yugoslav journal on 4 September, Garaudy said that the main document showed socialist thought to be "in a state of stagnation," that it exhibited "a tendency to deny the contradictions within the socialist camp and within each socialist country," and that the agreement reached at the conference was possible only because of the elimination from consideration of the Czechoslovak and Chinese questions and of "the central problem" of different roads to socialism.

GARAUDY'S REBUTTAL

L'HUMANITE published Garaudy's rejoinder on 2 January, after the maverick Politburo member had charged on French television that the party would permit him to expound his views only in private sessions with other party leaders and not in the party press. Commenting on a

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 18 -

Garaudy TV interview, L'HUMANITE stated on 6 December that he had the right to express his views within the party Politburo and cited Waldeck Rochet's October plea to him to participate in the preparations for the 19th congress, but concluded that "regrettably" Garaudy "prefers the dubious publicity which television affords him." According to AFP, Garaudy replied in a radio broadcast that he was using broadcast media to express his views because he was not given access to the pages of L'HUMANITE. On 16 December, PCF Secretary Georges Marchais declared in a radio interview--reported by L'HUMANITE the next day--that in fact "Garaudy has the right, just like anyone else," to participate in the pregress discussion carried on in the party press.

In his article published in L'HUMANITE on 2 January, Garaudy complained that the paper had not published letters he had sent to Waldeck Rochet defending and elaborating his position, despite his request that they be printed. He also charged that the 19 December issue of L'HUMANITE had carried a "strange assemblage of garbled quotations" from his book which "completely distorts" his position. In explaining his views, Garaudy set out to establish a link between the PCF's domestic platform and Soviet repression of the Czechoslovak experiment. Asserting that the PCF still stands for "the possibility of peaceful ways, the possibility of advancing toward socialism with a plurality of parties and movements, a conception--not formal, but concrete--of democracy," he said recent events show that these theses are not "recognized as valid or tolerated" either by the Chinese or by the Soviet leaders, "who have put an end, through military intervention, to an attempt by the Czechoslovak communists to proceed in the same direction as we." He argued that it would be in the PCF's interest to overcome its reticence on the Czechoslovak issue:

I have concluded that it was not sufficient to disapprove the military nature of the intervention or to condemn it only as a formal violation of the principles of the autonomy of parties, . . . but that it was necessary to analyze the theoretical and political principles underlying it which implicate our party's entire policy and the French concept of socialism. That is why it appears to me absolutely necessary to say to the French people: the socialism which our party wants to instill in France is not that which is today imposed militarily on Czechoslovakia.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 19 -

In a footnote to the article, L'HUMANITE noted that a Central Committee commission charged with monitoring pregress discussion had induced Garaudy to remove "two brief passages" from his article after indicating to him that they contradicted "the norms for relations between fraternal parties."

The PCF's equivocal stand on the Czechoslovak question is registered in recent articles in the party press and in the draft theses for the 19th congress. Marchais, in an interview carried in the November issue of the PCF monthly LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE, stated:

Where Czechoslovakia is concerned, it is a question of a disagreement on our part on a specific and limited point: the 21 August 1968 intervention. It is true that this disagreement is serious and raises the question of certain principles. But it is not a question for us of challenging, on the basis of this limited disagreement, the whole of the policy of the brotherly parties with which we disagree! We reject this absolutely.

Then, rationalizing the PCF's silence on post-invasion developments, he declared:

And today, if we believe it is necessary to avoid doing anything which might hinder the efforts of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to overcome the serious crisis which has affected it, it is not in the name of nonintervention, but because this is what is dictated by concern to see the building of socialism in Czechoslovakia resumed and carried forward.

L'HUMANITE has itself indicated that the PCF's stance on Czechoslovakia could impair prospects for a political understanding with other French leftist parties. The 8 December L'HUMANITE reported the statement of a Socialist Party leader who, after stating that the French left could not achieve a majority "without PCF participation," added that "he could not understand the PCF's silence" on Czechoslovakia. In a defensive reply, L'HUMANITE said that it could not understand a view which "seems to want to make the united action of all French leftwing forces dependent on an agreement concerning the Czechoslovak events."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 20 -

The draft congress theses, published in L'HUMANITE on 15 November, virtually ignore the Czechoslovak issue. The only direct reference appears in the following tortuous passage:

The PCF is convinced that the existence of differing views of a given issue should in no case hamper or undermine the joint struggle by fraternal parties The PCF plans to develop and increase its close cooperation with the CPSU and all other communist parties in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the conclusions of the Moscow conference. This attitude, which it has continually defended and brought to bear, including after voicing its disagreement with military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, is our fundamental attitude--an attitude of principle.

In his 2 January article in L'HUMANITE, Garaudy suggested three revisions of the draft theses, one of which was that the party take "a clear stand on our path to socialism and make a clear judgment on behavior in the communist movement that opposes it."

LOUIS ARAGON'S POSITION

Garaudy has an ideological ally in the party in the person of Louis Aragon, member of the PCF Central Committee and a prominent intellectual. Like Garaudy, Aragon has persisted in open dissent from the party line on the Czechoslovak situation; but unlike Garaudy, he has not so far been publicly censured by the party. The 8-14 October issue of LES LETTRES FRANCAIS, a publication Aragon directs, carried the text of a circular issued by the Czechoslovak Minister of Education instructing rectors and deans of Czechoslovak universities to submit reports on the views and loyalty of faculty and students. Calling the circular even worse than the August 1968 invasion, Aragon commented that it institutes "systematic informing as a national duty" in a socialist country. Somewhat defensively, he said it was "more than unlikely" that the PCF would "ever go back on what we stated in August 1968" with regard to the invasion.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 21 -

PRAVDA Backs French Politburo Against "Right Opportunist"

On 5 and 8 January Radio Moscow broadcast the PCF Politburo indictment of Garaudy's book to Yugoslav audiences, and Soviet comment comes a week later in a 15 January PRAVDA article pegged to PCF preparations for the 19th congress. As reviewed by TASS, the article cites some of the French Politburo's censure of Garaudy's book and castigates him for espousing a "rightwing opportunist platform" at odds with the party's "general line." PRAVDA goes on to accuse Garaudy of breaking "completely" with Leninism and of slandering the USSR and the CPSU. The book "clearly shows his revisionism," PRAVDA says, criticizing Garaudy for trying to "create the impression that the countries building socialism only create different 'patterns' of socialist development--patterns that can be accepted or rejected." The article depicts Garaudy as an isolated heretic:

Having no support among the French communists, Garaudy is not averse to using bourgeois radio and television for expounding his views The double-dealing of Garaudy, who attacks the party at a complex period of acute social struggle, causes legitimate indignation among French communists.

PRAVDA notes that the PCF press has been publishing articles and letters containing "strong but just criticism" of Garaudy. It makes a number of flattering references to the PCF and to the preparations for the congress, stating that discussions of the draft theses "show the political awareness and theoretical maturity of the French communists." It concludes that the PCF "enjoys the trust" of much of the French working class, which regards the communists as "the most loyal, staunch, and consistent defenders of their interests."

While the article could be intended as encouragement of PCF sanctions against Garaudy, its appearance could have the counter-productive effect of making the PCF more vulnerable to charges of subservience to Moscow at a time when the party is seeking a political understanding with the other leftist parties.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 22 -

THE USSR

KALMYK REMOVED FROM POST AS SMOLENSK FIRST SECRETARY

On 30 December, PRAVDA announced that N.I. Kalmyk has been released as Smolensk obkom first secretary "in connection with his appointment as first deputy minister of procurements for the RSFSR." Since late 1968 there had been repeated criticism of Smolensk for shortcomings in agriculture, industry, and political indoctrination.

It is possible, however, that Kalmyk's demotion resulted less from these ostensible deficiencies in the work of the oblast than from certain articles he authored in 1968 warning against abuses of power by individual leaders. While his articles consist of general propositions and local examples rather than criticism of any individual leader by name, they do present a consistent argument for limitations on a leader's power, and could conceivably be read as a challenge to Brezhnev's authority. It is noteworthy that the shortcomings of Smolensk began to be exposed following the publication of Kalmyk's articles.

Criticism of Smolensk Leadership Began at End of 1968

Kalmyk's agricultural leadership in Smolensk was first criticized in a 26 December 1968 PRAVDA article, which pointedly called for an "intensification of organizational work" in his bailiwick. A month later, on 30 January 1969, Kalmyk admitted in PRAVDA that the criticisms were correct: "The low level of leadership and lack of concreteness and speed in the work of leading agricultural organs of the oblast had a negative effect on the growth of productivity and the increase in the production of grain and other crops." The obkom bureau ordered the oblast executive committee to eliminate the shortcomings.

On 4 March a SOVIET RUSSIA article and editorial criticized political information work in Smolensk, and these shortcomings were acknowledged by the Smolensk bureau in SOVIET RUSSIA on 25 April. Sometime in the spring or summer of 1969 the oblast executive committee chairman, A.T. Gnedov, was replaced (he was last identified on 5 February 1969 in SOVIET RUSSIA). His replacement, Central Committee instructor D.I. Filatov (see TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 29 October 1968), was first identified on 24 September 1969, in PRAVDA. Filatov delivered the report on the oblast's agricultural tasks at the December 1969 obkom plenum which replaced

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 23 -

Kalmyk with second secretary I. Ye. Klimenko. Oddly, all central papers carried identical reports on the Smolensk plenum, except that the single sentence referring to Filatov delivering the report was carried only by PRAVDA.

One final criticism of Smolensk appeared on the very day the Smolensk plenum was announced. On 30 December IZVESTIYA carried an article describing an acute labor shortage in Smolensk and indicating that if indiscipline and inefficiency at Smolensk plants were eliminated large numbers of surplus workers could be released and transferred to fill the vacancies. Without directly criticizing the oblast leadership, the article proposed that Smolensk oblast apply the Shchekino labor-saving experiment: "Smolensk, which today lacks many thousands of workers at present production facilities, could become a good base for checking the economic experiment on the scale of a whole oblast." Noting that other oblasts with similar industries were applying the Shchekino system, the article indicated that its application in Smolensk would supply precisely the number of workers lacking. The oblast had been trying to solve its labor problem--for example, by creating a department for use of labor resources two years ago--but had apparently failed.

Shortly after Kalmyk's removal a Smolensk party aktiv meeting discussed a wide variety of shortcomings: "serious omissions in the work of many enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes," "cases of an irresponsible attitude toward observance of party and state discipline," ineffective use of capital investments, and insufficient "acceleration of technical progress, introduction of complex mechanization of labor-consuming processes, scientific organization of labor and raising of the economic effectiveness of production" (PRAVDA, 11 January 1970). Speeches at the meeting urged more criticism and self-criticism, intolerance toward the "slightest manifestations of indiscipline," and more help for primary party organizations.

Kalmyk Warned Against Abuses of Power by Leader

It is possible that Kalmyk offended certain of his superiors by publishing an article in IZVESTIYA on 7 July 1968 that contained an unusually sharp warning against abuses of power by political leaders:

The power of each leader in our country is strictly limited and he himself is under constant control. Any attempt to increase his power is immediately suppressed and often is evaluated as a serious crime. . . . V.I. Lenin indicated that the first

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 24 -

duty of an administrator is to beware of getting carried away with giving commands We [in Smolensk] give decisive significance to the ability to combine collegiality with one-man leadership in a correct manner.

A little later, in SOVIET RUSSIA on 3 September, Kalmyk again elaborated on this theme. Opening with a detailed description of a raykom first secretary who had become immodest, rude, and overbearing, and thus was called to order by the obkom bureau, Kalmyk then offered some general observations on proper conduct for a leader:

To be a leader is not just a high honor but also a big responsibility. As a teacher is for his students, so a director of an enterprise or a chairman of a kolkhoz must be for his subordinates--that is, a brilliant model of humanity and respect. It is especially important for a party official to remember this. He must show an example of modesty and justness, demandingness and principledness, possess certain oratorical abilities, and be able to persuade people and not force his opinion on them. . . .

We always strive to give principled evaluation to every instance of deviation from Leninist requirements in the conduct of this or that leader.

Kalmyk continued to pursue the same theme in a book published in early 1969 entitled "Responsibility of a Communist." According to a review of Kalmyk's book by Yu. Kuznetsov in PARTY LIFE No. 16, August 1969, pages 78-79, "the author devotes special attention to the responsibility of leaders. To be a leader means to be the most authoritative person in the collective. Analyzing the work experience of the Smolensk oblast party organization, the author shows that an undisciplined official who has lost a measure of demandingness toward himself, who has lost the feeling of personal responsibility for his assigned work, does not have the moral right to be the leader of a collective."

Kalmyk cited the example of the Sychevsk raykom's work in raising the responsibility of each Communist, "and especially of leaders," for their assigned work. Reviewer Kuznetsov, paraphrasing Kalmyk, wrote that "in implementing the very high principle of party leadership--collegiality--the raykom strengthens ties with Communists and with all

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 25 -

workers, develops principled criticism and self-criticism, awakes creative thought and, as a result, evokes businesslike, concrete proposals."

Almost as if it were reacting to Kalmyk's favorable judgment, SOVIET RUSSIA on 4 March 1969 singled out the Sychevsk rayon leaders for criticism in a lengthy article on political information work. In its lead editorial, the paper pointed to the political information work in Sychevsk rayon as a bad example and declared that the rayon's "shortcomings are significantly greater" than its successes. On 25 April SOVIET RUSSIA reported that the Smolensk bureau had admitted the criticism of the shortcomings of the Sychevsk raykom leaders to be correct. SOVIET RUSSIA's chief complaint was that residents in outlying villages were not being sufficiently informed about local news--a longstanding problem in many if not most areas.

CONSERVATIVE WING OF UKRAINIAN WRITERS UNION MAKES GAIN

The conservatives in the Ukrainian Writers Union leadership seem to have scored a victory of sorts in their maneuverings against Ukrainian Writers Union head Oles Honchar and his fellow moderates. As in April 1968 and December 1968, the challenge to Honchar has come from the Kiev organization headed by his conservative rival Vasil Kozachenko.

A November 1969 meeting of the Kiev writers union party organization attacked the Ukrainian Writers Union leadership, a December 1969 meeting of the board of the Kiev writers union expelled dissident writer Ivan Dzyuba from the union, and a late December session of the Ukrainian Writers Union presidium run by Honchar's conservative rivals Yuriy Zbanatskiy and Kozachenko wrung a partial recantation from Dzyuba in return for allowing him to remain in the union. The proceedings against Dzyuba were conducted without the participation of Honchar, who has not joined in criticizing Dzyuba in the past.

DZYUBA'S RECANTATION

LITERATURNIA UKRAINA on 6 January reported that the new Kiev writers union (established in February 1969 under Kozachenko) had late last year expelled Dzyuba from the union for allowing his book "Internationalism or Russification?" to be published abroad. Then, apparently at the end of December, the Ukrainian Writers Union board presidium held a session to discuss the case. It was chaired by the board's first deputy chairman, Zbanatskiy, not by chairman Honchar.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
15 JANUARY 1970

- 26 -

Kiev writers union head Kozachenko reported on the Kiev organization's action and raised the issue for consideration by the presidium. Dzyuba then delivered a statement dated 26 December denouncing foreign use of his work and declaring he had "nothing in common with the ideology of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." There followed by a discussion of Dzyuba's "serious ideological errors." All members of the nine-man Ukrainian Writers Union secretariat spoke, excepting Honchar. The speakers stressed that Dzyuba's statement was only the "first step" and his continued membership in the union depends on further actions by him. Zbanatskiy summed up, declaring that Dzyuba's statement "gives grounds to believe that he sincerely wants to remain" in the union. The session then approved the action of the Kiev writers union on Dzyuba's violations of the writers union statutes, but said he could stay in the union in light of his protest against the use of his work by hostile ideologists, his regret that his manuscript "got abroad into the dishonest hands of various falsifiers," and his pledge henceforth to observe the union statutes.

MANEUVERING AGAINST HONCHAR

The Kiev organization's move against Dzyuba appears to be part and parcel of continuing maneuvers against Honchar. It was the Kiev writers union party organization--then headed by Kozachenko--that served as a forum for attacks on Honchar's novel "Sobor" ("The Cathedral") in April and December of 1968. The December 1968 Kiev meeting also initiated the attacks on Dzyuba. Honchar has not participated in the attacks on Dzyuba and other dissident writers spearheaded by Kozachenko.

A December 1968 reorganization of responsibilities in the Ukrainian Writers Union leadership placed Kozachenko on virtually an equal footing with Honchar; another reorganization less than two months later, in mid-February 1969, reversed that of the previous December.* Honchar was again clearly preeminent, but this time conservative author Zbanatskiy was moved up to first deputy head: chairman of the board Honchar, first deputy Zbanatskiy, and deputies Kozachenko and Novychenko. At the same time, a Kiev writers union was established with Kozachenko as chairman and with Honchar among the Kiev board members (LITERATURNIA UKRAINA, 28 February 1969).

* See FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA for 30 January and 13 March 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 27 -

The continuation of the struggle is attested to by the proceedings of the November 1969 meeting of the Kiev writers union party organization. This meeting--like those in April and December 1968--served as a forum for extensive attacks on the Ukrainian Writers Union leadership. The publishing house, the journals, and the newspapers of the union were assailed for irresponsibility and low ideological level (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 21 November 1969). "Certain officials" of the Ukrainian Writers Union apparatus were criticized for "certain errors and irresponsibility and an indifferent and unconscientious attitude to their work." Speakers--including I. Telman, one of the critics of "Sobor" in December 1968--urged the "leadership of the writers union to draw a wider circle of writers into active public work" Although Honchar's book was not criticized directly, the Kiev meeting did stress that "the least ideological imprecision in this or that work, even as a result of oversight, becomes food for hostile propaganda." This intimation is more relevant to Honchar's "Sobor" than to Dzyuba's openly anti-Soviet book.

Honchar's activities have not been reported since he spoke on behalf of the Ukrainian Writers Union at the 10-11 December joint plenum of USSR creative artists unions. At that plenum USSR Writers Union Secretary G. Markov and the first secretary of the Moscow writers union, S. Mikhalkov, applauded the Ryazan writers union for expelling Solzhenitsyn. In his speech Honchar kept to the innocuous topic of Lenin.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 28 -

COMMUNIST CHINA

ECONOMIC PRODUCTION CLAIMS, ASPIRATIONS HIGHLIGHTED IN MEDIA

CPR media, especially on the provincial level, have presented a New Year's picture of hard-won success on the economic front with generally high if not record outputs in agriculture and record production outputs in many factories. Current successes are, however, not viewed as an end but as an interim step, with even greater effort and output necessary in the coming year.

Chekiang province has been the most open in discussing its achievements and plans. It has reflected most of the economic themes noted throughout China, though uniquely in a context of claiming to have exceeded the "magnificent quotas" set up by the "national program for the development of agriculture" in the areas of grain, cotton, and hog raising. A CHEKIANG DAILY editorial on 24 December warned, however, that these achievements only "represent a new starting point for our cause." Regarding some commodities the quotas have not yet been met; even in areas which have met the quotas, and with similar objective conditions, yields vary widely. Some counties exceeded 1,000-catties per mou while others fell below quota standards of 800 catties per mou.

National agricultural plan quotas (which according to original plan should have been achieved throughout China in 1968) are clearly not to be regarded as ends in themselves but as stepping stones. As the editorial noted, "there are still more potentialities in production which have not yet been explored." Since the Tachai bridge located in the poor farming areas of north China has surpassed the 800-catty mark in grain production, Chekiang, located south of the Yangtse, should be able to "realize the per-mou grain output of 1,000 catties in the next 3 to 5 years." (The national plan formulated in 1956 called for north China yields amounting to only half those for south China; using this relative standard south China still has considerable room for improvement since Tachai this year achieved an output of 900 catties per mou according to brigade secretary Chen Yung-kuei in a talk broadcast by Peking on 6 January.)

Grain continues to be described as the basic factor, but several provinces have called for a balanced development of other types of crops as well, usually in the context of their plans for 1970. Canton radio on 9 January talked of the need to raise production in forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, and sidelines as well as

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 29 -

in sugarcane, cotton, and oil-bearing crops. While amounts of gains expected were not specified, an earlier Canton broadcast on 27 December noted that Fokang county had planned for a 20 percent increment in grain production and a 30 percent rise in total yield in the coming year. This sort of target represents something of a departure from recent years during which goals have usually hovered around the 10 percent increase mark. Hog production is projected as rising 82 percent. These goals are to be obtained in part, according to a NANFANG DAILY editorial, by expanding the total area sown by one-third. Other measures proposed include the universal introduction of fine strain seed and better veterinary services.

Fukien Radio Tells of High Targets for Model Brigade

Foochow radio on 5 January presented a fairly comprehensive model of how agricultural production can be increased, telling of one brigade which is trying to "change its poor and backward state in one year" by a policy of setting up a production plan "with reasonably high targets." The targets are apparently much higher than those originally set forth, which had taken into consideration "the poor land in this area," but it is stressed that the plan is "practical" and "down to earth." Many of the production goals smack of the "great leap forward," even if the rhetoric takes note of that disaster in its emphasis on the possible.

One measure to be taken to improve production is to plant two crops of rice this year on expanded acreage; of the current total of 2,400 mou of farmland 1,500 will be planted in early rice. To make up for the resulting soil depletion, the plan envisions a fivefold increase in fertilizer, from 8 to 40 piculs per mou; also, a new strain of rice will be introduced. While pigs are to increase threefold, providing some of the additional fertilizer needed, the plan will clearly require outside resources of fertilizer as well. Conditions in the area involved are relatively favorable, and if the brigade is to be a provincial model success may be achieved. But other areas in Fukien province might find it difficult to emulate this success unless they also border on a river and a railroad line, and are likewise close to Foochow and only about 50 miles from the traditional double-cropping boundary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 30 -

A FUKIEN DAILY commentator's article released on the 5th stressed that a production plan must contain concrete measures which are practicable "in accordance with the concrete local conditions" and with leeway provided to allow for natural disasters. Nonetheless the goals now being publicized seem to call for the outer limits of the possible; the peasants will have to work at capacity throughout the year, with failure even more likely should the weather not favor double-cropping or the expected fertilizer fail to materialize.

Fukien may now be emulating the allegedly successful policies of neighboring Kiangsi, which for the past year has been the leader at least in publicizing new approaches to agriculture and is now caught up in a "two breakthroughs" movement to raise agricultural and industrial production. A 27 December Nanchang broadcast noted that the movement had progressed from a few advanced examples in the early stages to "a massive movement involving some 12 million people," over half the province's population. The focus of the movement is to introduce "a seed strain of early rice and raising hogs with saccharified fodder," while at the same time starting massive water conservancy projects and building roads "for preparedness against war."

Variant Views on Industrial Priorities Indicated

In the industrial area too, propagandists seem to be discussing future plans and hoped-for achievements in a slightly more forthcoming way. In recent months one major aspect of the war-preparations theme has been the call to build independent industrial systems within individual areas. Now some opposition to at least the more extreme versions of this plan may be developing in Shanghai and other large industrial centers--just as it did in the late fifties when similar trends toward decentralization threatened the raw-material supplies of the larger centers. There is probably general basic agreement under current conditions that emphasis today must be on small and medium enterprises; but some may fear lest the emphasis on smaller, dispersed units threaten the viability of existing large enterprises.

During the leap forward period, Shanghai chief Ko Ching-shih advanced the thesis that the whole country should be treated as a coordinated chessboard--that is, in economic planning care should be taken to use resources in the most appropriate manner.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 31 -

Shanghai, for example, should continue to have access to sufficient raw materials to supply its factories rather than see capacity lie idle while new, less efficient factories usurp nearby raw materials. While Ko Ching-shih has been repeatedly glorified during the cultural revolution for the support he lent to Chiang Ching's efforts to reform the arts in Shanghai, the chessboard slogan was given very little currency until recently. Now, in addition to apparent indirect invocations of the chessboard principle, a HUPEH DAILY editorial on 6 December has specified the need to "establish the mentality of 'the whole country as one chessboard'" in order to "complete large-scale socialist construction tasks." With perhaps special reference to the situation in Wuhan, a major center of heavy industry, the editorial noted that labor and materials must be employed "so that they can be sent to places where they are urgently needed."

RED FLAG Article States Opinions of Shanghai MRC

On 24 December NCNA released an investigation report from RED FLAG No. 12 written by the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee. The article applauded the establishment of a network of small chemical fertilizer plants in the rural counties of Shanghai under the principle that large, small, and medium-sized industries should be developed simultaneously. The report noted numerous advantages for the small plants including lower production costs, the ability to produce the right fertilizer needed at the right time, and reduction in transport strain and costs.

The report again invoked the ghost of Ko Ching-shih in recalling his support for the small plants; however, in so doing the report made an unusual proviso--"they must not be permitted to lose money permanently." This proviso, issued under the authority of Ko Ching-shih's name, may be an attempt to place the small-enterprise trend in proper perspective: small fertilizer plants, with guaranteed consumers, would be legitimate, but not necessarily small steel plants.

The RED FLAG investigation report is unusual in openly bringing forward the issue of raw material supplies. While the report stated that "no guarantee for raw materials" is needed and noted that in 1962 when Tsao Ti-chiu tried to close plants the workers in some plants went out to the coal fields to get their own supplies, there is at the same time the idea that policies which result in a lack of supplies are sabotage. Small plants are not presented as a cure-all, and the many problems that the fertilizer plants experienced at the start are indicated.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 32 -

A 12 January Commentator's article in the WEN HUI PAO again raised the chessboard idea, both for the country as a whole and for the smaller area setting up an industrial network. The article concentrated on manpower, taking the usual line that fewer people can accomplish the required work and that organization can be simplified. In the course of the article it noted that in manpower the question is whether to "coordinate all the activities of the country as in a chess game or to promote the ownership of production means by small groups; whether to put large-scale cooperation into practice or to keep everything to ourselves; and whether to do everything in our power to support the major construction projects or to look after only our own interests and leave the difficult tasks to others." While in this context advanced factories are asked to transfer their best technicians to other units ("obviously some units may encounter certain difficulties"), the technicians are not apparently to be sent outside the Shanghai area, but merely to aid in more desperate situations within the administration unit. The article thus emphasizes the need to supply major projects on a priority basis without directly indicating that surrounding areas may be guilty of holding back resources from Shanghai.

The move to establish locally independent industrial networks is advocated by Mao and has been propagandized throughout the country. Some provinces seem especially active in this regard, however. The leader currently is Chekiang, now embarked on a campaign for provincial self-sufficiency in coal. Kiangsi too has been a prominent advocate of self-sufficiency; a 1 December Nanchang broadcast said "the several hundred" commune industries in Pinghsiang municipality have formed an industrial network. While there is no patent disparity between the Chekiang/Kiangsi position and that of Shanghai, a continued stress on self-sufficiency by Shanghai's neighboring provinces might well indicate irritation over the need to provide Shanghai with vast quantities of foodstuffs and raw materials.

RED FLAG URGES CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO PARTY REBUILDING

Some of the problems hindering party rebuilding efforts since the Ninth Party Congress were outlined in a RED FLAG article released by NCNA on 5 January. The article, written by the propaganda team of the model PLA 8341 unit at the Peking "7 February" locomotive and rolling stock plant, tells how the plant overcame interference from the "right" and the "left" in the course of party consolidation; no new party units were claimed for the plant, however.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 33 -

Interference from the right, from those who hold that the masses should not take part in party rebuilding, was condemned in the article as the thinking of a small number of people who fear the masses. The article also attacked the "leftists," those who urge that cultural-revolution rebels must lead the way in party building. The masses, RED FLAG argued, must be educated and guided "to oppose interference from the 'right' as well as from the 'left'" in rebuilding the party as a disciplined organizational structure.

Emphasizing its strictures against "leftists," RED FLAG warned that those who say "we are entitled to join the party because we have won merits in rebellion" and those who claim that "we should be admitted into the party because we are leading members of a revolutionary committee" must meet the requirements for party membership; it is "incorrect to lower the standards to suit them." The article firmly stated that the party must not be turned "into an organization consisting of different factions" nor should it admit "unqualified persons into the party with such excuses as work requirements." To build the party correctly, "the most important thing is to establish good leading groups" made up of "outstanding communist party members."

Another RED FLAG article, written by the newly formed party committee at the Hsinhua printing plant, and released by NCNA on 3 January, pointed to continuing problems in the plant that was termed a model for emulation by NCNA on 15 December. The article called upon cadres in the plant to sustain their opposition to those who, influenced by anarchism and factionalism, seek to "undermine the newborn proletarian political power."

This cautious approach to rebuilding the party expressed in the RED FLAG articles appears to be reflected in at least two recent Shanghai radio reports. On 12 January Shanghai radio reported on a meeting on party building held by the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee which called for a "powerful party core of leadership" to be formed so that efforts can be "made to absorb new party members in accordance with the stipulations of the new party constitution." Before new party members are admitted, however, efforts must be made to "educate party members as well as activists who have applied for party membership on the theories of the party formulated by Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tsetung Thought." The meeting concluded that "the criteria for acceptance into membership of the party must be correctly understood" so that as candidates become ripe for membership, they "will

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 34 -

be developed" and "strictly adhere to the procedures for admission into the party." The report cautioned that "extreme care" must be used in granting "full membership to probationary party members."

A radio report from Shanghai on 7 January reported on the activities of a party core group in a local plant which is busy educating its party members in a proper party spirit so that "concrete plans" to "attain specific goals" can be made. The broadcast said that monthly meetings are held by the core group "to hear the opinions of the masses" and "to sum up and exchange experience in the party's organizational life."

New Party Units Supreme Over Revolutionary Committees

The supremacy of new party units over established revolutionary committees, proclaimed in the 15 December NCNA report on a new party committee for the Hsinhua printing plant, was spelled out in more detail in a 13 January Chengchow radio report. The broadcast noted that, after the establishment of the party branch for a local county post office, some leadership members "failed to treat the relationship between the party branch and the revolutionary committee correctly" and the "party branch was unable to play its proper role as the core." Study classes, formed with the assistance of PLA personnel, were held to help strengthen organizational discipline--although "one of the leading members of the revolutionary committee and the party branch wanted to suspend these classes, owing to pressure of work."

The deputy secretary of the party branch, who is also chairman of the revolutionary committee, then firmly stated that "we must defend at all times the absolute leadership of the party within the revolutionary committee." After discussion, a plan was worked out to strengthen party leadership. In the future, it was announced, "all important problems concerning principles or policy matters must first be studied and decided directly by the party branch, before they are discussed, passed and implemented by the members of the revolutionary committee" so that the core leadership role of the party branch is guaranteed. Thus it appears that mere administrative functions will be relegated to the revolutionary committee, while a small core of party members, no doubt members also of the revolutionary committee, will be the real decision-makers.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 35 -

Hunan County Reviews Relations Between Army and Party

An 11 January Changsha broadcast of an article by the Hsintien County People's Armed Forces Department noted in unusual detail mistakes made by the military in guiding local affairs prior to formation of a county CCP committee in December. The article continues a trend noted in a number of other propaganda pieces over the past few months--replacing the old notion of a near-perfect PLA with the thesis that it is the PLA party committee alone that is incapable of error.

Eighty percent of the cadres of the People's Armed Forces Department are said to have taken part in the work of revolutionary committees, under the guidance of the CCP committee of the department--although especially in the early period "certain comrades in the department lacked a clear understanding" of the importance of the work. One section chief for a time held the mistaken notion that it would be best to "withdraw troops and return to barracks." Problems were probably exacerbated during this period by conflicts between the Hunan Military District, controlling unit for the county department, and outside, apparently more "radical" troops brought into the province.

Even after the initial period "some leaders in the department" clearly erred in the direction of "building peacefully," but again the party committee of the department revealed its omnipresent wisdom and halted revolutionary committee investment in constructing roads and buildings. The "grave dangers of war" were used as the excuse to halt construction (although the Kiangsi provincial radio on 27 December described road building as a war preparations measure).

After establishment of the county revolutionary committee, problems in handling the relationship between the armed forces department and the committee developed, with "some comrades" of the department becoming arrogant and "confusing relations between the department and the committee." This trend was soon "severely" denounced by the CCP committee of the department as a "stupid concept" inimical to Mao's principle of a three-way alliance. The party committee then "firmly" supported the government, "ourselves acting as the backing and pillar of the revolutionary committee."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 36 -

The theme of party control in the army has been a major component in central media attacks on certain "reactionary" films charged with neglecting the role played by the army's political officers. The trend may be related to the recent surfacing of the army's General Political Department and some of its subordinate branches during the past two months. In any case, the result has been new publicity for the political commissar. An NCNA item on 26 December praised the party committee of a certain Shenyang regiment for helping lower-level units make complete reforms. In the process the article noted basic errors by a company party branch, but only to illustrate the importance of the party in forming good units. In one example, the regimental deputy political commissar went to a company "which had not the slightest chance to be commended as a 'four good' company," discovered that the party branch had done a poor job, and changed the company into one selected as an advanced collective unit. The principal notions criticized by the political commissar were "the absurd ideas of 'technique first' and 'military affairs first' pursued by counterrevolutionary revisionists Peng Te-huai and Lo Jui-ching."

New CCP Committee Established for Shaoshan Commune

On 9 January Changsha radio broadcast a brief announcement on the establishment of a new party committee for the commune at Shaoshan, Mao's birthplace. The party branch of the Shaoshan brigade, founded by Mao himself over 40 years ago, was the subject of favorable central propaganda attention last July. On 2 July NCNA described the Shaoshan branch as "the staunchest one in China's countryside," with "a glorious revolutionary tradition." And on 5 July NCNA reported that party members of the Shaoshan branch were earnestly studying the 1 July joint editorial, which emphasized the need to move ahead with building the CCP, and pledged to do a good job in rebuilding efforts. So far, apparently, NCNA and other central media have made no mention of the setting up of the Shaoshan commune party committee.

INNER MONGOLIAN RADIO HALTS LOCAL BROADCASTS IN MANDARIN

The Inner Mongolian regional radio suddenly ceased its local broadcasts in Mandarin on 5 January. Since then it has limited itself to relaying Radio Peking programs. It was last shut down

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
15 JANUARY 1970

- 37 -

in this manner for several months in early 1967. There continues to be some local programming in Mongolian, the content of which is being checked.*

The Kweichow and Szechwan provincial radios continue to limit themselves to relaying Peking, as they have done since last September and November respectively. The one other provincial-level radio that as a consequence of internal dissensions had been relaying Peking solidly, the Shansi radio, resumed local programs on 3 January.

* On 2 January, just before it ceased local broadcasting in Mandarin, the Inner Mongolian radio broadcast a report on study of the New Year's editorial by members of "the CCP core group of the Inner Mongolian Regional Revolutionary Committee." It may be that provincial-level radios are not authorized to refer to specific party core groups at this high a level. Only two such references have been noted since the Ninth Congress--a previous one by the Inner Mongolia radio on 27 November last year, and a report by the Tsingtao city radio on 4 January that the CCP core leading group of the Shantung Provincial Revolutionary Committee had issued a notice on studying the New Year's editorial. The Shantung provincial radio, reporting on the same notice, said simply that it was issued by the Shantung PRC, with no mention of the core group.

CONFIDENTIAL